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I. INTRODUCTION
An observer of the federal administrative/regulatory system once
stated that government agencies can be divided into two categories:
"Deliver the Mail" and "Holy Grail.".1 "Deliver the Mail" agencies perform
neutral, mechanical, logistical functions; they send out Social Security
checks, procure supplies, or deliver the mail.2 "Holy Grail" agencies, on
the other hand, pursue an often more controversial and difficult mandate to
realize some grand, moral, civilizing goal.
The earliest regulator of electronic communications in the United
States, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), came into being primarily to
"deliver the mail,"-that is to act as a traffic cop of the airwaves. How-
ever, both the FRC and its successor agency, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission), had a vague but oft-repeated Holy
Grail clause written into their charters: the requirement that they uphold
the "public interest, convenience and necessity.
' 3
Perhaps no single area of communications policy has generated as
much scholarly discourse, judicial analysis, and political debate over the
course of the last seventy years as has that simple directive to regulate in
the "public interest." Critics of this public interest standard have often
charged that the phrase "is vague to the point of vacuousness, providing
neither guidance nor constraint on the [regulatory] agency's action."4
1. Taylor Branch, The Culture of Bureaucracy: We're All Working for the Penn Cen-
tral, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1970, at 8, 20.
2. Id.
3. Glen 0. Robinson, Title I, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins
and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934
3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
4. Id.
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Moreover, as former FCC Commissioner Ervin Duggan recently observed,
"successive regimes at the FCC have oscillated wildly between enthusiasm
for the public interest standard and distaste for it."5 If the history of this
elusive regulatory standard makes anything clear, it is the fact that just
what constitutes service in the "public interest" has encompassed different
things at different times.
This Article identifies the current contours of the public interest stan-
dard as they have emerged from statute, regulatory activity, and judicial
scrutiny over the last eight decades.6 First, the Article reviews the histori-
cal context of Congress's early efforts at broadcast regulation. Second, it
traces the development of the substantive characteristics and elements of
the standard through a survey of the pivotal interpretive rulings of the FRC
and, later, the FCC concerning the standard. Third, it examines the impact
that the United States Supreme Court has had in shaping the standard in a
series of important decisions. Finally, the Article offers some general ob-
servations about the nature of the public interest standard as a device that:
(1) eludes satisfactory definition; (2) remains to a great extent dependent
on a consensus that must be repeatedly fashioned anew from among the
competing values and interests (economic, social, political, and constitu-
tional) at stake in the decision-making process; and (3) one that, notwith-
standing its shortcomings, still enjoys significant support.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
At a fundamental level, the public interest standard is rooted in stat-
ute. Under sections 307 and 309 of the Communications Act, the FCC may
grant the use of a frequency for a limited term to an applicant that demon-
strates that the proposed service would serve "the public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity." 7 License renewal applicants are to be evaluated un-
der the same standard.8 Although the standard has become a keystone of
5. Ervin S. Duggan, Congressman Tauzin's Interesting Idea, BRDCsT. & CABLE, Oct.
20, 1997, at S18.
6. This Article draws heavily on ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLrnCs OF
BROADCAST REGULATION (1982); F. LESLIE SMITH Er AL., ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND
GOVERNMENT, THE REGULATION OF WIRELESS AND WIRED MASS COMMUNICATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1995); and JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991).
7. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 307, 309, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 307, 309 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997)).
8. Congress did not uniformly use the phrase "public interest" in the Communications
Act. For example, the standard of "public interest" is specified in sections 201(b), 215(a),
319(c), and 315(a); "public convenience and necessity" in section 214(a) and (c); "interest
of public convenience and necessity" in section 214(d); "public interest, convenience and
necessity" in sections 307(c), 309(a), and 319(d); "public convenience, interest or neces-
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contemporary communications regulatory policy, it has not always enjoyed
such status. On the contrary, as discussed below, the present contours of
the standard, and the concomitant regulatory authority it vests in the FCC,
have evolved over the course of time and experience and reflect the
changing tapestry of American culture over several generations.
A. The Radio Act of 1912 and the Annual Radio Conferences
The Wireless Ship Act of 1910 applied to the use of radio by ships,9
but the Radio Act of 1912, enacted in the wake of the Titanic disaster, was
the first domestic law for general control of radio.' ° It empowered the Sec-
retary of Commerce and Labor to issue licenses for radio stations to United
States citizens upon request and to specify the frequencies to be used by
the stations. However, the 1912 Act gave the Secretary no authority to re-
ject applications. Congress had not anticipated the rejection of applications
because it presumed that there was sufficient spectrum for all who needed
to operate radio stations.
The unregulated growth of radio stations in the early 1920s created
intolerable interference. In response, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover convened a series of four annual national radio conferences in
which representatives of the radio industry and government met to adopt a
system of self-regulation. Secretary Hoover first expressed the concept of
a public interest in radio communications in a speech before the Fourth
Annual Radio Conference in 1925. He stated:
The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for public
benefit. The use of a radio channel is justified only if there is public
benefit. The dominant element for consideration in the radio field is,
and always will be, the great body of the listening public, millions in
number, countrywide in distribution. There is no proper line of conflict
between the broadcaster and the listener, nor would I attempt to array
one against the other. Their interests are mutual, for without the one
the other could not exist.I
The Conference generally endorsed the public interest concept and rec-
sity" in section 307(a); and "public interest, convenience or necessity" in sections 311 (b)
and 311(c)(3) (emphases added). On September 17, 1986, the FCC recommended that Con-
gress drop all broadcast-related mentions of "convenience" or "necessity." It called the
words "superfluous.... To the extent the issues embodied in these terms are relevant to
radio regulation, they are subsumed under Commission review of the 'public interest."'
FCC Legislative Proposal, Track I, 25 (Sept. 17, 1981). Congress did not amend the Act as
the FCC had proposed.
9. Wireless Ship Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629 (1910).
10. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
11. Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for
Regulation of Radio 7 (Nov. 9-11, 1925) (Government Printing Office 1926).
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ommended legislation incorporating it. But the delegates ultimately
"gridlocked" on the idea, apparently because no one could come up with
an acceptable definition.1
2
Congressman Wallace H. White, Jr., one of the co-authors of the Ra-
dio Act of 1927, stated that despite the inability of the delegates to the Ra-
dio Conference to agree on a definition, the "public interest" was a central
concern in writing the 1927 Act:
[The radio conference] recognized that in the present state of scientific
development there must be a limitation upon the number of broad-
casting stations and it recommended that licenses should be issued
only to those stations whose operation would render a benefit to the
public, are necessary in the public interest, or would contribute to the
development of the art.... If enacted into law, the broadcasting privi-
lege will not be a right of selfishness. It will rest upon an assurance of
public interest to be served.
13
Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow has commented that, starting with
the Radio Act of 1927, the phrase "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity" has provided the battleground for broadcasting's regulatory debate.
4
Congress's reason for including such a phrase was clear: the courts, inter-
preting the Radio Act of 1912 as a narrow statute, had said that the Secre-
tary of Commerce could not create additional rules or regulations beyond
that Act's terms. 5 This left Hoover unable to control the rapidly changing
technologies. In the words of Senator Clarence Dill, one of the co-authors
of the 1927 Radio Act, Hoover "issued everybody a license who has made
application, and that has brought the present chaos."' 6
The public interest notion in the 1927 and 1934 Acts was intended to
enable the regulatory agency to create new rules, regulations, and stan-
dards as required to meet new conditions. Congress clearly hoped to create
12. Broadcasters' Public Interest Obligations and the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of
1991: Hearing on S. 217 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. 2-3 (1991) (statement of Alfred C.
Sikes, Chairman, FCC).
13. 67 CONG. REc. 5479 (1926).
14. NEWTON N. MiNow, EQUAL TIME, THE PRvATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 8 (1964).
15. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 283 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923), writ of error dis-
missed as moot, 266 U.S.C. 636 (1924), where the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that Secretary Hoover had the discretion under the Radio Act to select a
frequency and set the hours of use, but lacked discretion to deny any application for a li-
cense not otherwise specifically barred by the Radio Act of 1912. Two years later, in United
States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926), the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois determined that the Radio Act of 1912 did not authorize the
Secretary of Commerce to deny the issuance of licenses or to require operation on a precise
wavelength or under certain time constraints not specifically provided for in the Act.
16. 68 CONG. REC. 3031 (1927).
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an act more durable than the Radio Act of 1912.
B. The Radio Act of 1927
In contrast to the 1912 Radio Act's narrow limits on the power of the
Department of Commerce to "traffic control," Congress intended in the
Radio Act of 1927 to delegate broad regulatory powers to the FRC, limit-
ing that agency's discretion mainly by the requirement that its actions
serve the public interest. 7 The 1927 Act employed a utility regulation
model under which broadcasters were deemed "public trustees" who were
"privileged" to use a scarce public resource. The FRC explained this pub-
lic trust model as follows:
[Despite the fact that] [t]he conscience and judgment of a station's
management are necessarily personal ... the station itself must be op-
erated as if owned by the public.... It is as if people of a community
should own a station and turn it over to the best man in sight with this
injunction: 'Manage this station in our interest....' The standing of
every station is determined by that conception.I
s
Nevertheless, the origin of the phrase "public interest, convenience,
and necessity" is not evident from the legislative history of the Radio Act
of 1927. Former FCC Chairman Minow recounted a conversation with
then Senator Clarence C. Dill, which shed some light on the question. Ac-
cording to Senator Dill, the drafters had reached an impasse in their at-
tempts to define a standard for the regulation of radio stations. A young
lawyer who had been loaned to the Senate by the Interstate Commerce
Commission said, "[w]ell, how about 'public interest, convenience and ne-
cessity'? That's what we [need] there." Dill replied, "[t]hat sounded pretty
good, so we decided we would use it, too."' 9 However, while the fortuitous
emergence of the public interest standard satisfied the immediate need of
the drafters, the difficult work of giving the standard meaning in the con-
text of radio regulation was left unfinished.
17. J. Roger Wollenberg, Title III, The FCC as Arbiter of 'The Public Interest, Con-
venience, and Necessity', in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 61, 65.
18. The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast
Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. B.J. 5, 14 (1950) (quoting Schaeffer Radio Co., an unpublished
1930 FRC decision).
19. NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND:
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1995). The phrase came from an
1887 Illinois railroad statute which was adapted into the Federal Transportation Act of
1920. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876), the Supreme Court held that states may
regulate the use of private property when the use was "affected with a public interest." In
the Transportation Act of 1920, which amended the Interstate Commerce Act, the device of
a certificate of convenience and necessity was first applied to the regulation of interstate
commerce.
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II. IMPLEMENTATION BY THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION
A. The 1928 Statement
Following enactment of the 1927 Act, the FRC, in 1928, issued its
first comprehensive interpretation of the public interest standard.20 The
Commission indicated that it would apply the standard to programming
content as well as technical matters. Broadcasters, the FRC said, should
not use their stations for their own private interests, and the interests of the
audience should take precedence over those of licensees. The FRC con-
cluded its policy statement with the following observations on the public
interest standard:
In conclusion, the commission desires to point out that the test-
"public interest convenience or necessity"--becomes a matter of com-
parative and not an absolute standard when applied to broadcasting
stations. Since the number of channels is limited and the number of
persons desiring to broadcast is far greater than can be accommodated,
the commission must determine from among the applicants before it
which of them will, if licensed, best serve the public. In a measure,
perhaps, all of them give more or less service. Those who give the
least, however, must be sacrificed for those who give the most. The
emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the convenience,
and the necessity of the listening public, and not on the interest, con-
venience, or necessity of the individual broadcaster or the advertiser.
2
'
Only a year after the release of the policy statement, the FRC expanded
upon its new regulatory mandate, providing further guidance on the
meaning of the "public interest" in Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Fed-
eral Radio Commission.
22
B. The Great Lakes Decision
Great Lakes Broadcasting2 involved a conflict among three Chicago
area stations requesting modification of their technical facilities. In as-
sessing their competing claims, the Commission advanced the following
guidelines as a gauge for assessing a licensee's performance under the
public interest standard:
(1) a station should meet the "tastes, needs, and desires of all
substantial groups among the listening public... in some
20. 2 FRC ANN. REP. 166 (1928).
21. Id. at 169-70.
22. Great Lakes Brdcst. Co., 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32 (1929), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
23. Id.
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fair proportion, by a well-rounded program, in which en-
tertainment, consisting of music of both classical and
lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, impor-
tant public events, discussions of public questions,
weather, market reports, and news, and matters of interest
to all members of the family find a place;"24
(2) programming would be considered at renewal time in de-
termining whether a station has met public interest require-
ments;2'
(3) where two stations apply for the same frequencies, the sta-
tion with the longest record of continuous service has the
advantage; where there is a substantial difference between
the programming service of the two, the station with supe-
rior programming will have the advantage;26 and
(4) there is no room for operation of "propaganda stations," as
opposed to "general public-service stations." 27
The Great Lakes Broadcasting decision has been considered to be the
FRC's most important decision because it "contain[ed] the seeds of con-
,,28cepts that would later germinate into significant regulatory policies ....
The decision firmly established programming content as a criterion of the
public interest, and included notions which later formed the basis for the
FCC's requirements governing ascertainment of community needs and the
Fairness Doctrine.29
C. Denial of Licenses Based on Program Content
The FRC used its powers under the public interest standard to revoke
the licenses of two stations based solely on its review of the licensee's
programming practices. These actions, described below, were taken de-
spite the no-censorship provision of section 29 of the 1927 Act, which
provided in relevant part:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the li-
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 32-35.
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id. at 35. In Great Lakes Broadcasting, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), the Court of
Appeals upheld the FRC's decision to consider programming as a primary criterion of the
public interest standard.
28. F. LEsLIE SMIrH ET AL., supra note 6, at 240.
29. Id.
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censing authority the power of censorship over the radio communica-
tions or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communications.
30
1. The Brinkley Case
In 1930, the FRC denied renewal of the license of KFKB, Milford,
Kansas, on the ground that the station was being controlled and used by
Dr. John Brinidey, the "goat-gland doctor," to further his personal inter-
est.31 The "Medical Question Box," a program aired in three half-hour
segments daily, featured Dr. Brinkley answering questions from listeners
on health and medicine. In response to listener questions, Dr. Brinkley
usually recommended several of his own prescriptions from his own
pharmaceutical supply house. The FRC held that Brinkley's practice of di-
agnosing patients who he had not seen contravened the public health andS 32
safety and therefore, the public interest. It also found that he operated
KFKB solely for his own private interests.33
In affirming the denial of KFKB's renewal, the Court of Appeals re-
jected Brinkley's argument that the FRC violated the no-censorship prohi-
bition of section 29 of the Radio Act, stating:
This contention is without merit. There has been no attempt on the part
of the commission to subject any part of appellant's broadcasting
matter to scrutiny prior to its release. In considering the question
whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served by
a renewal of appellant's license, the commission has merely exercised
its undoubted right to take note of appellant's past conduct, which is
not censorship.
The court agreed with the FRC that broadcasting "is impressed with a
public interest" and observed that because "the number of available broad-
casting frequencies is limited," the FRC has the authority to "consider the
character and quality of the service to be rendered. ' 35
2. The Shuler Case
The FRC also denied the application for renewal of license of KDEF,
Los Angeles. That a station was used primarily to broadcast sermons by
30. 47 U.S.C. § 29 (1927). The no-censorship provision was reenacted as section 326
of the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. 326 (1994).
31. KFKB Brdcst. Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 672.
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Trinity Methodist Church's pastor, Reverend Bob ("Fighting Bob") Shuler,
who attacked Jews, the Roman Catholic Church, law enforcement officials
in Los Angeles, and many others. Shuler based his appeal on constitutional
grounds, namely, that the FRC decision violated his First Amendment
right to free speech and his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.
One of the issues before the Court of Appeals was whether the FRC' s
refusal to renew Shuler's license was a prior restraint under the then re-
cently decided case of Near v. Minnesota, 6 or just a post-publication pun-
ishment. The court concluded that while a citizen has in the first instance
the right to utter or publish his sentiments, it is "upon condition that he is
responsible for any abuse of that right., 37 The refusal of the FRC to renew
a license "to one who has abused it to broadcast defamatory and untrue
matter," the court found, "is not a denial of the freedom of speech, but
merely the application of the regulatory power of Congress in a field
within the scope of its legislative authority. '38 The court held that Rever-
end Shuler's broadcasts did not contribute to the "public interest," the test
• 39
the FRC was "required to apply" in considering renewal applications.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Although the decisions in Brinkley and Shuler vindicated the FRC's
powers to review programming to determine whether or not it was in the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity," the FCC used its program-
ming regulatory powers cautiously during the 1930s and early 1940s, with
the exception of forcing most of the remaining propaganda stations off the
air.40 However, in the mid-1940s, primarily because of the changing
economies of network radio, the FCC decided it was time for another gen-
eral policy statement and directed its staff to consider the public interest
implications of radio programming trends.4'
36. Near, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
37. Trinity Methodist Church S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 851 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 685 (1932).
38. Id. The Court also held that the refusal to renew a license is not a taking within the
Fifth Amendment, stating that "[t]here is a marked difference between the destruction of
physical property and the denial of a permit to use the limited channels of the air." Id. at
853 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 852.
40. DONALD M. GILLMER ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW, CASES AND COMMENT
739 (1990).
41. Id.
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A. The Blue Book
In 1946, the FCC released the staff report entitled Public Service Re-
sponsibility of Licensees, which became more popularly known as the
"Blue Book" because of its blue cover.42 The Blue Book attempted to clar-
ify the Commission's position on the public interest standard by setting
forth programming guidelines for consideration of a licensee's perform-
ance at renewal time. The Blue Book treated the public interest as encom-
passing four requirements: (1) "sustaining" (unsponsored) programs; (2)
local live programs; (3) programming devoted to the discussion of local
public issues; and (4) the elimination of advertising excesses.43 While li-
cense renewal forms were revised to make them compatible with the Blue
Book, the FCC neither adopted the Blue Book nor repudiated it. One com-
mentator observed:
Its theme of balanced programming as a necessary component of
broadcast service in the public interest coupled with its emphasis on a
reasonable ratio of unsponsored ('sustaining') programs posed too se-
rious a threat to the profitability of commercial radio for either the in-
dustry, Congress, or the FCC to want to match regulatory promise with
performance."
4
B. 1960 Program Policy Statement
Based on a series of hearings which it conducted in the late 1950s,
the FCC concluded that additional clarification of the public interest stan-
dard was necessary. In 1960, the FCC adopted a Report and Statement of
Policy (1960 Programming Policy Statement) which listed the "major ele-
ments usually necessary to meet the public interest:
' 5
1. Opportunity for Local Self-Expression 8. Political Broadcasts
2. Development and Use of Local Talent 9. Agricultural Programs
3. Programs for Children 10. News Programs
4. Religious Programs 11. Weather and Market Reports
5. Educational Programs 12. Sports Programs
6. Public Affairs Programs 13. Service to Minority Groups
7. Editorialization by Licensees 14. Entertainment Programming
42. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE REsPONSIBILrrY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946), reprinted
in DOCUMENTs OF AMERICAN BROADCAsTING 133-231 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 3d ed. 1978).
43. Id.
44. DocuMENTs OF AMERIcAN BROADCASTING, supra note 42, at 133.
45. Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291,
7295 (1960).
46. Id.
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These types of programs, in some reasonable mix, were considered to be
evidence that broadcasters were serving the public interest. The 1960 Pro-
gramming Policy Statement also concluded that broadcasters should de-
termine the tastes, needs and desires of the community and design pro-
gramming to meet those needs. This led to the-FCC's adoption of formal
ascertainment requirements, which compelled applicants for broadcast li-
censes to detail the results of interviews conducted by the applicant with
community "leaders" in nineteen FCC specified categories ranging from
agriculture to religion. 47
C. The Marketplace Approach to Interpreting the Public Interest
Standard
Against this background of detailed regulation, beginning in the late
1970s, the FCC reinterpreted the public interest standard in the light of the
"marketplace." Under this approach, regulation is viewed as necessary
only when the marketplace clearly fails to protect the public interest, but
not when there is only a potential for failure.4 ' Early in his administration,
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, made clear that he intended to take a
"marketplace approach" to broadcast regulation:
Put simply, I believe that we are at the end of regulating broadcasting
under the trusteeship model. Whether you call it "paternalism" or
"nannyism," it is "Big Brother," and it must cease.
I believe in a marketplace approach to broadcast regulation....
Under the coming marketplace approach, the Commission should, so
far as possible, defer to a broadcaster's judgment about how best to
comete for viewers and listeners because this serves the public inter-
est.
1. Radio and TV Deregulation
In its Deregulation of Radio'° decision in 1981, the FCC eliminated
47. Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Brdcst. Applicants, Report
and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1507 (1971).
48. The rationale for marketplace regulation was presented in a law review article by
Chairman Fowler and Daniel Brenner, his legal assistant. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L.
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207 (1982).
Critical of the "trusteeship model" and the use of the "vague" public interest standard to
impose programming restrictions, they concluded that in light of advances in electronic ra-
dio technology, the scarcity rationale was no longer viable and that the marketplace, the
listeners and viewers should define the public interest. In their view, the public interest
standard abridged broadcasters' First Amendment rights.
49. Mark S. Fowler, The Public's Interest, Address at a Meeting of the International
Radio and Television Society (Sept. 23, 1981), in COMM. & L., Winter 1982, at 51, 52.
50. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
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rules and policies governing program logs, commercial time limitations,
ascertainment of community problems, and non-entertainment program-
ming requirements. The Commission stated that it recognized that its ac-
tions "remove the illusory comfort of a specific, quantitative guideline,"5'
but that Congress deliberately placed the public interest standard in the
Communications Act to provide the Commission with maximum flexibil-
ity in dealing with the ever-changing conditions in the field of broadcast-
ing:
The Commission was not created solely to provide certainty. Rather,
Congress established a mandate for the Commission to act in the pub-
lic interest. We conceive of that interest to require us to regulate where
necessary, to deregulate where warranted, and above all, to assure the
maximum service to the public at the lowest cost and with the least
amount of regulation and paperwork.
52
In 1984, the Commission adopted decisions generally granting to commer-
cial television, and to non-commercial broadcasters, the degree of deregu-
lation afforded commercial radio stations in 198 1.
53
2. "Underbrush" Policies
In repealing a number of policies affecting programming and various
commercial practices, the FCC indicated its concern for the First Amend-
ment rights of broadcasters in interpreting the public interest standard:
[P]olicies cautioning broadcasters not to engage in certain program-
ming practices or establishing rigid guidelines relating to such pro-
gramming raise fundamental questions concerning the constitutional
rights of broadcast licensees, and therefore cannot be retained in the
absence of a clear and compelling showing that the public interest de-
mands their retention.
F) 1 (1981), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub. nom. Office of Comm. of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (1983).
51. Id. para. 10.
52. Id.
53. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies Ascertainment Require-
ments, and Program by Requirements for Commercial TV Stations, Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1075, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1005 (1984); Revision of Program Policies and
Reporting Requirements Related to Public Brdcst. Licensees, Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 746, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1157 (1984). In Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals upheld the elimination of pro-
gram lists mandated by the FCC's TV Deregulation decision, but ruled that the Commission
had failed to explain adequately the elimination of commercial guidelines for children's
programming.
54. Elimination of Unnecessary Brdcst. Reg. and Inquiry into Subscription Agree-
ments, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1043 (1983). The FCC eliminated prohibitions against rat-
ings distortion conflicts, of interest of station personnel, promotions of non-broadcasts in-
terests, misleading concert promotions, failure to adhere to sales contracts, and the
broadcast of false, misleading, and deceptive commercials.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the FCC's elimination of "underbrush" policies in Telecommuni-
cations Research and Action Center v. FCC, thereby approving the
agency's reliance on marketplace forces. The Court held that the public
interest standard is best left to the discretion of the FCC, which "may rely
upon marketplace forces to control broadcast abuse if the Commission rea-
sonably finds that a market approach offers the best means of controlling
the abuse. 56
3. Postcard Renewal Form
The FCC's decision to issue a shortened renewal form (the so-called
"postcard renewal") was challenged by Black Citizens for a Fair Media on
the ground that the abbreviated renewal form violated the FCC's mandate
to determine that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be
served by granting a license. 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed the simpli-
fied renewal process, holding that the Communications Act did not require
the FCC to ask program-related questions and that the Commission could
make public interest determinations using the simplified procedure."
4. Fairness Doctrine Repeal
In Syracuse Peace Council,59 the FCC abolished the Fairness Doc-
trine which imposed a two-fold duty on broadcast licensees to provide
coverage of "controversial issues of public importance" and to afford "a
reasonable opportunity" for the airing of contrasting points of view.60 The
55. TRAC, 800 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
56. Id. at 1185.
57. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 409 (1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
58. Id.
59. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against TV Station WTVH, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541 (1987) [hereinafter
Syracuse Peace Council Opinion and Order], reconsideration denied by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 2035, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1073 (1988). Finding that
the Fairness Doctrine inhibited broadcasters from covering controversial issues, the Com-
mission held "that under the constitutional standard estiblished by Red Lion and its prog-
eny, the fairness doctrine contravenes the First Amendment and its enforcement is no longer
in the public interest." Id. para. 61. In Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C.
1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld
the Commission's public interest finding but declined to address the constitutional issues.
Judge Starr, in a concurring opinion, stated that he would uphold the FCC's finding that the
Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional.
60. See, e.g., Committee for the Fair Brdcst. of Controversial Issues, Report and Order,
25 F.C.C.2d 283, para. 25, 19 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 541 (1973) (stating "strict adherence to the
fairness doctrine" was the "single most important requirement of operation in the public
interest-the 'sine qua non' for grant of a renewal of license.").
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Commission repudiated the spectrum scarcity rationale for those require-
ments. Although the FCC disavowed any interest in calling into question
the validity of the public interest standard or eliminating its public trustee-
ship model for broadcast regulation by contending that it "may still impose
certain conditions on licensees in furtherance of [the] public interest,"6
one scholar commented that "it is clear that without spectrum scarcity,
there can be little left of the notion that a broadcaster must abide by a pre-
ordained federal conception of what constitutes broadcasting in the public
interest." 62
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD
The agency actions described in the foregoing sections, while un-
questionably important to our present understanding of the reach and
flexibility of the public interest standard, do not exist in a vacuum. Equally
important to the analysis is the contribution of the judiciary in its review of
those agency actions. Several decisions of the United States Supreme
Court are particularly noteworthy.
A. Nelson Brothers v. Federal Radio Commission
In 1933, the Supreme Court issued its first opinion involving the
public interest standard.0 The FRC had granted full-time operating
authority to WJKS, Gary, Indiana, at 560 kilohertz, and revoked the li-
censes of WIBO and WPCC, stations that shared time on that frequency
(the formats of NBC affiliate WIBO, and WPCC, a religious station, were
duplicated by other stations serving the Gary market). The Court, in af-
firming the FRC's decision, held that the Commission was entitled to
evaluate and consider programming provided by various stations:
In granting licenses the commission is required to act 'as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' ...
In the instant case the commission was entitled to consider the
advantages enjoyed by the people of Illinois under the assignments to
that state, the services rendered by the respective stations, the reason-
able demands of the people of Indiana, and the special requirements of
61. Syracuse Peace Council Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, para. 81, 63 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 541.
62. EMORD, supra note 6, at 236. Former FCC General Counsel Henry Geller agreed:
"[t]he fairness doctrine flows directly from the public trustee notion, and to eliminate the
fairness doctrine one must also eliminate the notion that broadcasters should act as public
trustees." Henry Geller, Broadcasting and the Public Trustee Notion: A Failed Promise, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 8, 87 (1987).
63. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. v. FRC, 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
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radio service at Gary.64
B. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
The Supreme Court upheld the public interest standard which it de-
scribed as the "touchstone" of authority for the FCC.6 It said that "[t]he
Commission's responsibility at all times is to measure aplications by the
standard of 'public convenience, interest, or necessity." The public in-
terest standard, the Court said, is "as concrete as the complicated factors
for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit" and the ap-
proach is "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion." 67
C. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio
The Supreme Court in the Sanders Brothers case held that the public
interest standard did not require the FCC to consider economic injury to
existing stations when considering an application for a new broadcast sta-
tion.6 ' The Court offered a narrower interpretation of the public interest
standard which suggested that the FCC had no supervisory control over
programs, business matters, or station policies:
[T]he Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licensee. The
Commission is given no supervisory control of the programs, of busi-
ness management or of policy. In short, the broadcasting field is open
to anyone, provided there be an available frequency over which he can
broadcast without interference to others, if he shows his competency,
the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability to make good use
of the assigned channel.
D. NBC v. United States
In the NBC case, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's "chain broad-
casting" network rules which were designed to allow network affiliates to
• 70
select programming free of network constraints. The NBC case represents
the most sweeping statement ever made by the Supreme Court in support
of the FCC's authority to regulate the electronic media because it:
(1) affirmed the right of the FCC to exercise broad powers
over the broadcasting industry;
64. Id. at 285.
65. FCC v. Pottsville Brdcst. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
66. Id. at 145.
67. Id. at 138.
68. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
69. Id. at 475.
70. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
[Vol. 50
THE SEARCH FOR THE HOLY GRAIL
(2) affirmed that the public interest standard is the touchstone
of FCC authority to exercise broad regulatory powers;
(3) held that the public interest standard is not unconstitution-
ally vague;
(4) offered a scarcity rationale-the notion that regulation is
necessary because the airwaves are limited-as justifica-
tion for the public interest standard and for content regula-
tion; and,
(5) ruled that regulations that may result in license revocation
or nonrenewal do not violate broadcasters' First Amend-
ment rights."
The following quote from the Supreme Court's majority opinion in NBC is
the most frequently cited authority for the expansive view of the FCC's
regulatory mission:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio
communication. Yet we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind
of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from
interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the Commis-
sion merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission
the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.
72
E. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
In 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's Fairness Doctrine as
well as its related personal attack and political editorializing rules in its
landmark Red Lion decision.73 In unanimously affirming the FCC, the
Court emphasized three key principles:
71. F. LB5LiESMrrHETAL., supra note 6, at 250.
72. NBC, 319 U.S. at 215-16. One commentator characterized the quote as:
[P]erhaps the most misinterpreted words in the judicial history of broadcasting
regulation .... Many readers of this part of the decision have taken this to mean
that the Court was approving FCC dictation of program content. In context, how-
ever, these two sentences simply say that the Commission has the authority to se-
lect licensees as well as to "supervise" them. "Traffic" in the Court's analogy re-
fers to licensees, not to programs.
DOcuMENTs OF AMERiCAN BROADCASTING, supra note 42, at 100.
73. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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(1) On the uniqueness of broadcasting: "Where there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an un-
abridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast compara-
ble to the right of every individual to speak, write, or pub-
lish."'74
(2) On the fiduciary principle: "There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requir-
ing a licensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary .... ""
(3) On the public interest: "It is the right of the viewers and
listeners , not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."
The Court added one significant caveat: if experience with broadcast tech-
nology post-1969 proved that "the net effect of [administration of the Fair-
ness Doctrine was to reduce] rather than [increase] the volume and quality
of coverage, there [would] be time enough to reconsider the constitutional
• .. - ,,71
implications.
F. CBS Inc. v. Democractic National Committee
The Supreme Court has observed in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee that the FCC must "walk a 'tightrope' to preserve the First
Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the Com-
munications Act."78 After referring to its Red Lion decision, the Court
noted that "[t]he problems of regulation are rendered more difficult be-
cause the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change;
solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those ac-
ceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence. 79
G. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
FCC that George Carlin's "filthy words" monologue was "indecent." °
Justice John Paul Stevens, in the prevailing opinion, explained that Car-
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id. at 389.
76. Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 393.
78. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
79. Id. at 102.
80. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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lin's words might be appropriate on other media, but not over the radio:
"[w]e have long recognized that each medium of expression presents spe-
cial First Amendment problems. And of all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protec-
tion."''. The opinion pointed out that "the broadcast media have established
a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans"-since listen-
ers are "constantly tuning in and tuning out," prior warnings would not be• .•82
effective in protecting the unwilling listeners.
H. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild
In WNCN Listeners Guild, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's de-
cision not to get involved in the regulation of radio station formats in a
case involving the decision of the proposed buyer of WNCN to change the
format from classical music to rock."' The Court found that marketplace
regulation was a constitutionally protected means of implementing the
public interest standard of the Communications Act.
84
I. FCC v. League of Women Voters
85In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the Supreme Court for the first
time found a broadcast regulation unconstitutional, namely, section 309 of
the Public Broadcasting Act which forbade editorializing by any noncom-
mercial station receiving funds from the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting.
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum
scarcity has come under increasing criticism in recent years. Critics,
including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC [Mark Fowler], charge
that with the advent of cable and satellite television technology, com-
munities now have access to such a wide variety of stations that the
scarcity doctrine is obsolete. We are not prepared, however, to recon-
sider our longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or
the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that
some revision of broadcast regulation may be required.
8 6
J. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
In its initial decision involving the FCC's rules requiring cable sys-
tems to carry the signals of local television stations, the Supreme Court, in
81. Id. at 748 (citation omitted).
82- Id.
83. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
84. Id. at 604.
85. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
86. Id. at 376 n.l1 (citation omitted).
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Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC," gave only lukewarm support
for Red Lionss and other decisions, noting that "the rationale for applying a
less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regula-
tion, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the
context of cable regulation."89
VI. THE EPHEMERAL YET MALLEABLE PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD
A precise meaning for the phrase "public interest" is extremely elu-
sive.90 Avery Leiserson offers a pragmatic but somewhat limited definition,
suggesting that "a satisfactory criterion of the public interest is the prepon-
derant acceptance of administrative action by politically influential
groups."9' Such acceptance is expressed, in Leiserson's opinion, through
groups that, when affected by administrative requirements, regulations,
and decisions, comply without seeking legislative revision, amendment, or
repeal.92 Thus, in order for a policy to be accepted by politically influential
groups, it must be relevant to, and must not conflict unacceptably with,
their expectations and desires. Defining the interest of the entire general
public proves to be considerably more difficult, especially if the general
public interest is viewed as more than just the sum of special interests.93
Besides providing flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, the
concept of the public interest contributes significantly to the regulation of
broadcasting in another sense. Even a generalized public belief in an unde-
fined public interest increases the likelihood that policies will be accepted
as authoritative. The acceptance of a concept of the public interest may
thus engender important support for the regulation of broadcasting and for
87. Turner, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
88. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 366 U.S. 367 (1969).
89. Turner, 512 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
90. "'Public interest, convenience or necessity' means about as little as any phrase that
the drafters of the [Radio] Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional re-
quirement that there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing
authority." Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity
as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REv. 295, 296 (1930).
91. AVERY LEISERSON, ADMINISTRATIvE REGULATION: A STUDY IN REPRESENTATION OF
INTEREsTS 16 (1942).
92. Id.
93. Ayn Rand has characterized the "public interest" as the "intellectual knife of col-
lectivism's sacrificial guillotine." "Since there is no such thing as the 'public interest' (other
than the sum of the individual interests of individual citizens), since that collectivist catch-
phrase has never been and can never be defined, it amounted to a blank check on totalitarian
power over the broadcasting industry, granted to whatever bureaucrats happened to be ap-
pointed to the Commission." AYN RAND, CAPITALIsM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 126 (1967).
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the making of authoritative rules and policies toward this end.94 For this
reason the courts traditionally have given the FCC wide latitude in deter-
mining what constitutes the public interest. As the Supreme Court noted in
1981:
Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission's
judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is entitled to
substantial judicial deference.... The Commission's implementation
of the public-interest standard, when based on a rational weighing of
competing policies, is not to be set aside.., for "the weighing of poli-
cies under the 'public interest' standard is a task that Congress has
delegated to the Commission in the first instance.
95
Judge E. Barrett Prettyman expanded upon the reasons for such def-
erence:
[I]t is also true that the Commission's view of what is best in the pub-
lic interest may change from time to time. Commissions themselves
change, underlying philosophies differ, and experience often dictates
changes. Two diametrically opposite schools of thought in respect to
the public welfare may both be rational; e.g., both free trade and pro-
tective tariff are rational positions. All such matters are for the Con-
gress and the executive and their agencies. They are political, in the
high sense of that abused term.
96
Despite the usefulness of the public interest concept in keeping up
with changing means of communication and the general tendency of the
courts to defer to the FCC's decisions, conflicts over the meaning of the
public interest have been recurrent in broadcast history. On occasion, the
vague statutory mandate to look out for the public interest has hampered
the development of coherent public policy because Congress (or influential
members of Congress) can always declare, "that is not what we meant by
the public interest."
Few independent regulatory commissions have had to operate under
such a broad grant of power with so few substantive guidelines. Rather
than encouraging greater freedom of action, vagueness in delegated power
may serve to limit an agency's independence and freedom to act as it sees
fit. As Pendleton Herring put it, "[a]dministrators cannot be given the re-
sponsibilities of statesmen without incurring likewise the tribulations of
politicians. 97
94. See VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 163-202
(1970).
95. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (quoting FCC v. Nat'l
Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978)).
96. Pinellas Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1007 (1956).
97. PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 138
(Russell & Russell 1967) (1936). Vagueness, however, may also serve to protect the agency
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Judge Henry Friendly, in his classic work The Federal Administrative
Agencies, offered the following comment on how the origin of the "public
interest, convenience and necessity" standard serves to confuse, not en-
lighten:
The only guideline supplied by Congress in the Communications Act
of 1934 was "public convenience, interest, or necessity." The standard
of public convenience and necessity, introduced into the federal statute
book by [the] Transportation Act, 1920, conveyed a fair degree of
meaning when the issue was whether new or duplicating railroad con-
struction should be authorized or an existing line abandoned. It was to
convey less when, as under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, or the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, there would be the added issue of selecting
the applicant to render a service found to be needed; but under those
statutes there would usually be some demonstrable factors, such as, in
air route cases, ability to render superior one-plane or one-carrier
service because of junction of the new route with existing ones, lower
costs due to other operations, or historical connection with the traffic,
that ought to have enabled the agency to develop intelligible criteria
for selection. The standard was almost drained of meaning under sec-
tion 307 of the Communications Act, where the issue was almost never
the need for broadcasting service but rather who should render it.
98
Since Congress has found it inadvisable or impossible to define spe-
cifically for future situations exactly what constitutes the public interest,
the political problem of achieving consensus as to the case-by-case appli-
cation of this standard has been passed on to the FCC. The flexibility in-
herent in this elusive public interest concept can be enormously significant
to the FCC not only as a means of modifying policies to meet changed
conditions and to obtain special support but also as a source of continuing
and sometimes hard-to-resolve controversy.
Disputes concerning legal prescriptions imposed by the Communica-
tions Act often have centered on recurring value conflicts-assumptions
about what ought or ought not to be done. One such question is the extent
to which broadcasting should pursue social as well as economic and tech-
nical goals. The emphasis on the social responsibilities of licensees rests
on the view that "the air belongs to the public, not to the industry" since
Congress provided in section 301 of the Communications Act that "no...
license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions,
and periods of the license."99 For example, the FCC has adopted rules and
when its decisions are challenged in the courts, since the judiciary may be loath to overturn
actions protected by a broad statutory mandate.
98. HENRY FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 54-55 (1962)
(footnotes omitted).
99. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1994)).
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policies designed to make broadcasters meet social responsibilities by re-
quiring them to implement equal employment opportunity programs for
women and minorities and to provide programming responsive to commu-
nity needs and interests.
Some of these rules and policies require broadcasters to present, or
refrain from presenting, content contrary to what they would choose to do
on their own. How far the FCC may go in the direct, or indirect, regulation
of content without violating either the Communications Act's own prohi-
bition in section 326 against censorship, or the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, remains unsettled.' °°
However, in the Communications Act Congress also directs the
Commission to regulate "in the public interest, convenience and neces-
sity."'' Using that standard, the Commission has promulgated many rules
and policies governing broadcast programming that could be regarded by
the courts as unlawful censorship of the print media. As noted earlier,
court cases involving Dr. Brinkley and Reverend Shuler held that the FRC
did not have to ignore content, that it could consider it without necessarily
engaging in censorship; later court cases have perpetuated the view that
government supervision of broadcast content is somehow more acceptable
than review of print. Clearly broadcasting continues to be plagued by di-
vergent views of how to balance freedom with achieving socially desired
and responsible service, while still not engaging in censorship.
Complicating this controversy is the conflict between First Amend-
ment provisions guaranteeing the right of broadcasters, like other media
owners and operators, to be free of government control over the content of
programming, and First Amendment theories developed exclusively for
broadcasting holding that the rights of listeners and viewers to receive in-
formation to be "paramount" over the rights of broadcasters. The theory is
that in the "scarce" medium of broadcasting, some affirmative government
intervention concerning content may be needed to ensure that the public
100. Equally troubling is the risk of self-censorship by broadcasters as a consequence of
indirect content regulations. Judge David Bazelon noted that while the main threat to
broadcasters remains that the government can put a licensee out of business, "the more per-
vasive threat lies in the sub rosa bureaucratic hassling which the Commission can impose
on the licensee, i.e., responding to FCC inquiries, forcing expensive consultation with
counsel, immense record-keeping and the various attendant inconveniences." Illinois Citi-
zens Comm. for Brdcst. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975). He further observed
that "licensee political or artistic expression is particularly vulnerable to the 'raised eye-
brow' of the FCC; faced with the threat of economic injury, the licensee will choose in
many cases to avoid controversial speech in order to forestall that injury." Id. For examples
of raised-eyebrow regulation, see ERwIN G. KRASNOW Er AL., FCC REGULATION AND OTHER
OXYMORONS: SEVEN AXIOMS TO GRIND, 5 CoMMIENTL.J. 759, 770-72 (1983).
101. See generally supra note 8.
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hears diverse ideas and viewpoints.02 J. Skelly Wright, a judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, has com-
mented:
[I]n some areas of the law it is easy to tell the good guys from the bad
guys .... In the current debate over the broadcast media and the First
Amendment... each debator claims to be the real protector of the
First Amendment, and the analytical problems are much more difficult
than in ordinary constitutional adjudication... the answers are not
103
easy.
These colliding statutory ground rules governing the freedom and
obligations of broadcasters have been melded into one of the law's most
elastic conceptions-the notion of a "public trustee. ' °4 The FCC views a
broadcast license as a "trust," with the public as "beneficiary" and the
broadcaster as "public trustee."'0 5 The public trustee concept naturally
flows from the conflicting statutory goals of private use and regulated al-
location of spectrum space. Congress gave the FCC the right to choose
among various candidates for commercial broadcast licenses and left it up
to the Commission to find a justification for providing a fortunate few with
the use of a valuable scarce resource at no cost. Legal scholar Benno
Schmidt, Jr., thinks the public trustee concept was designed to dull the
horns of the FCC's dilemma: to give away valuable spectrum space, with
no strings attached, would pose stubborn problems of justification.'0
However, as noted above, some of the strings attached-especially
those, like the FCC's Fairness Doctrine, that are content-related-have
been determined to violate the First Amendment. One option exercised by
the FCC to reduce controversy over its activities has been to substitute its
"content-neutral" or "structural" policies for policies that involve direct
review of content. Many FCC rules and policies-for example, the regula-
tion of station ownership patterns-have been of this type. They do not, on
their surface, look normative but are in fact examples of content-neutral
means of achieving social objectives.
For some years, however, there was hesitation over the substitution
of content-neutral, "structural" regulations for content regulation. Broad-
102. See Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). For further discussion,
see supra Part V.E.
103. Judge J. Skelly Wright, Speech Before the National Law Center, George Washing-
ton University (June 3, 1973), reprinted in FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD
GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING ix (1975).
104. This discussion is based on a theme developed by Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. BENNO C.
SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PuBLIC ACCESS 157-58 (1976). The phrase
"public trustee," however, does not appear in the Communications Act.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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casting was thought to be a scarce medium in which structural regulation
could not accomplish enough. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, ar-
guments began to be made more forcefully that FCC review of content
should be reduced and structural regulation preferred. Broadcasters tended
to argue that, at least in some instances, even structural regulation was
unjustified due to what they believed was reliance on an invalid premise:
scarcity. Behind many of these criticisms and controversies were changes
in electronic communications technology.
Although many correctly argue that the 1970s, the 1980s and the
1990s have been (and will be) particularly active decades in the develop-
ment and expansion of communications technology, the fact is that there
have long been two complementary and determinative features of Ameri-
can broadcasting: spectrum space scarcity and technological innovation.
Scarcity, of course, has always been the underlying raison d'itre for
broadcast regulation. Because one person's transmission is another's inter-
ference, Congress concluded that the federal government has the duty both
to select who may and who may not broadcast and to regulate the use of
the electromagnetic spectrum to serve the public.
Broadcasters argue that there is little justification for rigid govern-
ment regulation of ten or twenty or more competing radio stations in a
market while monopoly newspapers operate freely. As scarcity decreases,
they have argued, so should regulation. Former FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler has noted that "[s]carcity, to my mind, is a condition affecting all
industries. Land, capital, labor, and oil, are all scarce. In our society, we
allow the marketplace to allocate such goods. In this process, consumers'
interests and society's interests are well served."' 7 From this analysis of
the "myth" of scarcity, plus a review of traditional First Amendment the-
ory, Chairman Fowler concluded that in broadcasting, "[e]conomic free-
dom and freedom of speech go hand in hand," and advocated reliance on
minimally regulated marketplace forces rather than content regulation.08
The foregoing discussion highlights some of the issues which have
attended attempts to apply the public interest standard in particular regu-
latory circumstances. As is evident from the recitation of the origins and
development of the phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity,"
the task of formulating a standard for the digital television is a formidable
one. Despite the many criticisms of the standard, there is much support for
its retention in any legislation governing the regulation of broadcasters.
Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow has written that the words "public
interest" are "at the heart of what Congress did in 1934, and they remain at
107. Fowler, supra note 49, at 53.
108. Id. at 6.
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the heart of our tomorrows."' 9
The heart of the Communications Act is its clear emphasis on the pub-
lic interest. Whatever the temptations to abandon this notion-and
they are many-the stakes are too high. Without commitment to the
public interest, all government action vis-h-vis communications would
be without meaning.
10
VII. THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD IN THE DIGITAL AGE
As television broadcasters begin the transition from analog to much
more flexible digital technology, there have been calls for reexamination
of the public interest standard. The FCC told digital broadcasters that it
would consider changes to its public interest requirements,"' and President
Clinton appointed a Presidential Advisory Committee to determine
whether digital broadcasters should be given new public interest responsi-
bilities.
I2
An examination of the history of the public interest standard and its
application by the FCC and the courts, however, reveals no need for an
abrupt change in the evolving meaning of the public interest standard. The
genius of the public interest standard is its breadth and flexibility. The
public interest standard has steadily changed as the electronic media have
grown from a few AM. radio stations to the vast panoply of broadcasting
stations, multichannel video programming providers, satellite services, and
Internet services that Americans enjoy today. Digital television readily fits
into this framework.
Justice Stewart once remarked that "[t]here is never a paucity of ar-
guments in favor of limiting the freedom of the press."' 3 In deciding how
to regulate broadcasting, however, Congress rejected a vision of govern-
ment control. "Long before the impact and potential of the [broadcast] me-
dium was realized, Congress opted for a system of private broadcasters li-
censed and regulated by Government."' 4 Congress made clear in section
326 of the Communications Act that the FCC possesses no power to con-
trol the content of broadcast speech. While the Act explicitly reserves
"ownership" of the broadcast spectrum to the Government, this property
109. NEWTON N. MINOW, Commemorative Message, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at xvi.
110. Id.
111. Advanced TV Sys., and Their Impact Upon the Existing TV Brdcst. Serv., Fifth
Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 12,809, para. 50, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 863 (1997).
112. Exec. Order No. 13,038, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,065 (March 11, 1997).
113. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144 (1973) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
114. Id. at 116.
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interest has not been viewed as a significant alteration in the Act's basic
premise of licensing privately owned and controlled broadcasters.1
The tension between the Government's role in licensing broadcasters
and the First Amendment principles that Congress clearly sought to protect
in the Communications Act resulted in the "tightrope" that the Court de-
scribed in CBS v. Democratic National Committee. While the path has
neither always been clear, nor followed one direction, the history of the
FCC's interpretation of the public interest standard exhibits a definite pat-
tern of decreasing regulation in the face of an increasing number of infor-
mation sources.
In the early years of broadcast regulation, relatively few stations ex-
isted. Most markets had only one or two stations, and there had not yet
been time for a culture to develop within the broadcasting industry. The
regulators opted for specific and intrusive regulation of this new service.
The Radio Commission rejected Dr. Brinldey's application because he
used a station to advance only his own private interests without regard to
the needs of the public. The FCC later expanded this information, taking
the view that each station must serve a whole spectrum of interests. Even
as late as 1960, the Commission's Program Policy Statementl1 strongly
encouraged stations in large urban areas to include agricultural programs
among the subjects in their program mix.
During these years, the broadcasting industry matured and the num-
ber of broadcast outlets steadily multiplied. FM service began slowly, but
ultimately eclipsed AM as the dominant radio service. The number of ra-
dio stations grew from the few hundred when the FCC began regulation to
more than 12,000 today.1 7 Television service began and spread across the
country.
During the 1960s, the FCC undertook a campaign to encourage the
development of competitors to established broadcasters from both within
the broadcast industry and from without. In the industry, the Commission
worked to increase the number of radio and television stations by, among
other things, removing barriers to UHF television service and dramatically
increasing the number of FM radio stations. It also adopted rules to pre-
vent the national networks from dominating the television programming
market, and rules that helped to develop independent television stations.
115. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("There is, perhaps, good reason
for the [Supreme] Court to have hesitated to give great weight to the government's property
interest in the spectrum.").
116. See supra Part IV.B.
117. FCC News Release, Broadcast Station Totals as of Dec. 31, 1997 (Jan. 23, 1998)
<http:lwww.fcc.govlbureaus/MassMedialNewsReleases/1998/nrmn8002.txt>.
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Outside of broadcast service, the Commission worked to develop com-
petitors to broadcasting such as cable television and satellite broadcasting.
These efforts have borne more fruit than their proponents could have even
imagined.
The deregulation that began in the 1970s and resulted in the removal
of much of the FCC's detailed broadcasting rules in the 1980s appropri-
ately reflected these developments. With a multiplicity of broadcast sta-
tions and other communications providers available to the public, the need
for each station to serve the interests of all listeners and viewers seemed
less crucial. Instead, the FCC reasoned that as stations competed with each
other, particular stations would look to meet the needs of segments of the
audience that other stations overlooked, thereby increasing the value of
broadcasting to the entire community.
Further, the public service role of broadcasting had become part of
the industry's culture, as well as expected by the audience. Broadcast sta-
tions were and remain the dominant source of news, and broadcasters have
been the "glue" holding communities together in times of crisis or natural
disaster. The FCC found that the tradition of broadcasting and the demands
of the audience would ensure that broadcasters continued to serve the pub-
lic without the spur of detailed content regulations. Despite the absence of
FCC mandates, the time and resources devoted by local stations to news
programming has steadily increased."8
The FCC also recognized that the marketplace could more efficiently
determine the audience's needs and interests than could the government.
On that basis, the FCC rejected calls that it regulate radio stations' pro-
gram formats-a decision that was upheld by the Supreme Court in WNCN
Listeners Guild. 19 While critics at the time believed such regulation neces-
sary to preserve and protect format diversity, their fears have proven un-
justified and the range of radio formats has never been greater.
As the number of broadcast stations increased, and competing elec-
tronic media emerged, the FCC shifted the focus of its public interest
analysis from detailed prescription of broadcasting content to a reliance on
marketplace forces to ensure high quality broadcasting. Only in the case of
a perceived market failure-such as children's television-have Congress
and the FCC felt the need to return to particularized content regulation.'
20
118. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a
"Chilling Effect"? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
279 (1997) (observing an increase in informational radio programming after the repeal of
the Fairness Doctrine).
119. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
120. See Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
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Moreover, the constitutional foundation for renewed extensive con-
tent regulation of broadcasting has become increasingly uncertain. At a
time when broadcast outlets were few, one station's refusal to include a
particular point of view in its coverage might have prevented advocates of
.... 121
that view from communicating to the public. However, even as the Su-
preme Court was articulating this "scarcity doctrine" in Red Lion, the
emergence of more stations and competing media began to sow the seeds
of the doctrine's demise. The FCC itself recognized by 1987 when it re-
pealed the Fairness Doctrine that scarcity could no longer justify content
regulation. While the Supreme Court has yet to overrule Red Lion, it has
repeatedly noted the widespread criticism of that decision and announced
itself ready to reconsider it in an appropriate case.23
Even where content regulation has been permitted, the Court has re-
treated from treating broadcasting differently than competing media. The
"intrusiveness" rationale announced in PacificaT2 was long thought to be
limited to broadcasting. Two years ago, however, the Supreme Court ex-
tended it to cable in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Con-
sortium v. FCC with virtually no discussion.
In the absence of scarcity, justifying renewed regulation of broadcast
content becomes problematical. Professor Sunstein argues in favor of a
"Madisonian" approach to the First Amendment, suggesting that the gov-
ernment may intervene in broadcasting to promote certain democratic val-126
ues. Others, however, contend that such an approach gives the govern-
ment far too much power, and far too little guidance, to determine which
speech is acceptable and which not.' 27
121. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
122. Syracuse Peace Council Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 541 (1987), reconsideration denied by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd.
2035, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1073 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
123. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l1 (1984); see also Turner
Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (recognizing that "courts and commentators
have criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception"). Last year, five judges of the D.C.
Circuit opined that the time had long come for a reexamination of Red Lion. Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc); see also Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1443 (8th
Cir. 1993) (en bane) ("[D]evelopments subsequent to Red Lion appear at least to raise a sig-
nificant possibility that the First Amendment balance struck in Red Lion would look differ-
ent today.").
124. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
125. Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996).
126. See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 95 (1993).
127. See Burt Neuborne, Blues for the Left Hand: A Critique of Cass Sunstein's Democ-
racy and the Problem of Free Speech, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 423 (1995).
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The Supreme Court's recent First Amendment cases provide little
support for an interventionist view of the First Amendment. Even without
formally rejecting Red Lion, strong majorities of the Court have embraced
a Holmesian view where ideas compete in the marketplace free of gov-
ernment. In the first Turner case, the Court noted that its "cases have rec-
ognized that Government regulation over the content of broadcast pro-
gramming must be narrow .... It emphasized that "the FCC's
oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any particular
type of programming that must be offered by broadcast stations.' ' 9 In
Hurley, relying on its opinion in Turner, the Court went further: "While
the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior,
it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened
either purpose may strike the government."'" Thus, the courts are moving
away from any approval of government control over the content of broad-
cast speech.
In light of these judicial trends, the advent of digital television should
not be an occasion for increasing the FCC's public interest mandates on
broadcasters. It may be that digital television will not in the end be sub-
stantially different from television today and that most broadcasters will
provide viewers with programming on one high quality digital signal. In
that event, there would be no cause for a change in the FCC's interpreta-
tion of the public interest standard. The broadcast audience, however, may
instead demand that digital television be used, at least in part, for multiple
programs or for data transmission. Rather than justifying new and intrusive
public interest requirements, an increase in broadcasters' capabilities
would support a decrease in FCC regulations.
If digital broadcasters offer multiple channels or data services in ad-
dition to traditional broadcasts, the number of program services available
in a community will increase, carrying the potential to serve an even
greater range of diverse and unique interests. More channels and available
services should give the FCC confidence that a wide variety of needs and
points of view would be served. The agency would then have less reason to
require each station to provide particular types of service because compe-
tition among stations would likely ensure that a need not met by one sta-
tion or service would be addressed by another seeking to gain a position in
the market.
Even if broadcasters benefit from the possibilities offered by digital
128. Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 651 (1994).
129. Id.
130. Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995).
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television, the Communications Act's public interest requirement has not
been viewed so much as a quid pro quo for broadcasters obtaining spec-
trum than as a means of ensuring that the system of private broadcasting
will respond to public needs. The FCC has also historically viewed licen-
sees' efforts to develop more efficient technologies as a public interest
benefit, rather than as a justification for imposing increased responsibili-
ties. The advent of digital technology in other services, such as cellular
telephones, has not resulted in any change in those licensees' relationship
with the FCC.
This is not to say that the public interest mandate of the FCC should
disappear. Broadcast licensees should be responsible for establishing that
they have served the public, and have done so with all services they pro-
vide. The spectrum flexibility provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act so provide.' Under the public interest standard of the Act, the FCC
and broadcasters have worked together to provide the most diverse system
of broadcasting in the world. But the FCC has recognized that as the num-
ber of competing electronic "voices" has gone up, there is less need for the
government to ensure that individual broadcast stations serve particular
functions. The possibilities created by digital television technology com-
fortably fit within this history and justify, if anything, even greater reliance
on broadcasters and the market to ensure service to the public. As in the
past, broadcasters should be afforded the latitude to develop and offer pro-
gramniming best calculated to meet the needs of the communities they serve.
131. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West 1991 & Supp. 1997)).
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